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27 October 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : Robert M. Gates
NIO/USSR-EE

SUBJECT : Intelligence Community Views on Events in Poland

1. This morning I convened representatives of NFIB agencies to discuss the situation in Poland in anticipation of the general strike and Central Committee Plenum tomorrow. To my mild surprise, there was general agreement among the agency representatives on the following points:

- Jaruzelski Strategy: Jaruzelski's actions during the past week clearly suggest his determination to regain control of the country while avoiding a massive confrontation with Solidarity. His ultimate aim with respect to the Union is still unclear, but most believe that he would prefer to work out some sort of arrangements with Solidarity consistent with re-establishing government and party control.
- Troop Deployments: Dispersal of the "operational units" of soldiers around the country is intended to demonstrate government resolve and to increase its knowledge of troop reliability, popular attitudes and the economic situation. To have any real effect on the situation in the country, even in the narrow terms of improving distribution and supply, the troop contingents would need to grow beyond their current size.
- Military Operations: Despite preparations of the government in recent months to impose martial law, it can have confidence only in a few units--numbering about 35,000 men, not enough for a full scale confrontation with Solidarity. The latest government announcements have stressed law and order (not the danger of counter-revolution) and government preparations have centered on the militia.
- Leadership Changes: High-level personnel changes are expected in the Central Committee Plenum tomorrow. The direction of Jaruzelski's thinking and the political winds will be reflected in particular by Jaruzelski's choice to succeed him as Minister of Defense. For example, the appointment of General Molczyk would indicate a turn toward a hard line.

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-- Negotiations with Solidarity: Jaruzelski's statements suggest that he is mainly interested in isolating Solidarity extremists and enlarging the base of support for the government. However, to co-opt the Church and Solidarity, he would have to make important concessions.

--- Soviet Attitude: [redacted]

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[redacted] All analysts believe the Soviets are well briefed on Polish government plans and actions.


--- The General Situation: The risk of unpremeditated, rapidly escalating confrontation is increased by over-confidence on the part of both Solidarity and the government and danger of spontaneous regional explosions and radical pressures within Solidarity and the government.

-- [redacted]

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Robert M. Gates

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